The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 35
Number 2 Parameters Summer 2005

Article 9

5-1-2005

Beyond "Vom Kriege": The Character and Conduct of Modern War
R. D. Hooker Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters

Recommended Citation
R. D. Hooker Jr., "Beyond "Vom Kriege": The Character and Conduct of Modern War," Parameters 35, no. 2
(2005), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.2256.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

Beyond Vom Kriege:
The Character and
Conduct of Modern War
R. D. HOOKER, JR.

“You may not be interested in war . . . but war is interested in you.”
— Leon Trotsky

I

t is the tragedy of history that man cannot free himself from war. Indeed, far
more than by the development of art or literature or trade or political institutions, the history of man has been determined by the wars he has fought.
Time and again, advanced and cultured societies have been laid low by more
primitive and virile enemies with superior military institutions and a stronger
will to fight. The end of the Cold War, the rise of globalization, the spread of
democracy, and the advent of a new millennium raised hopes that mankind
might move beyond the catastrophic wars that shaped the 20th century. Those
hopes were dashed by Somalia and Rwanda and Bosnia, by the Sudan and the
Congo and Kosovo, by Chechnya and Afghanistan and Iraq. Understanding
war, not as we would like it but as it is, remains the central question of international politics. And for the most primal of reasons: War isn’t going anywhere.
Political and military leaders are notoriously averse to theory, but if
there is a theorist about war who matters, it remains Carl von Clausewitz,
whose Vom Kriege (“On War”) has shaped Western views about war since the
middle of the 19th century. While it goes too far to say, as John Keegan has,
that Clausewitz “influenced every statesman and soldier interested in war for
the past 100 years”—most never actually read or grasped him—Clausewitz
endures, not because he is universally understood or accepted but because he
is so often right about first principles.1 Much of what he wrote about the conduct of war in the pre-industrial era, about marches and magazines and the
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“war of posts,” fits best with his own time. But his insights about the nature of
war itself remain uniquely and enduringly prescient.
Clausewitz described war as “nothing more than a duel on a larger
scale . . . an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will.”2 Today, “war” is
used to mean very different things in very different contexts, from the war on
poverty to the war on drugs to the war on terrorism. Because it evokes a call to
action and stimulates national resolve, “war” is perhaps the most used and
abused word in the political lexicon. What does it mean precisely?
War is surely both a duel and an act of force, but it is perhaps best described as armed conflict between states. While not inconsistent with Clausewitz, this usage lends both simplicity and clarity to often-muddied waters.
Thus defined, war can be distinguished from raids, rescue operations, peacekeeping missions, counter-drug and anti-terror operations, military occupations, shows of force, and a host of other activities which involve the use of
military forces. Implicit in this usage is reciprocity; an unanswered, one-time
cruise missile attack is a military operation and a use of force, but hardly a
war. However ineffectually, however great the mismatch, both sides must
participate in the “duel” for war to exist.
Nor does official sanction particularly matter. Whether formally declared or not, war is war. Nowadays, even advanced states routinely forego
the diplomatic niceties, though all seek and welcome the imprimatur of international support and recognition when they can get it.
Here, “armed conflict” means fighting—not a show of force or the
threat of invasion, but actual combat. The difference is important because the
many gradations of the use of “forces” are distinct from the use of “force.”
Fundamentally, war itself is not about deterrence or dissuasion, although the
capability and the will to wage it may be. As Bedford Forrest so pungently put
it, “War means fighting. And fighting means killing.” The distinction is crucial. The chance of stumbling into war is too great. All too often, statesmen
have used the threat of war as a tool of policy, only to be astounded when it
fails and war erupts.
If war is armed conflict between states, what is its purpose? The purpose of war is to impose the will of one state on another by force. Ideally, wars
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are waged for some definable, rational purpose; as T. R. Fehrenbach explained, “The object of warfare is to dominate a portion of the earth, with its
peoples, for causes either just or unjust. It is not to destroy the land and people, unless you have gone wholly mad.”3
But not always. War also can be inchoate and incoherent, its object
not far removed from insensate mayhem. Sometimes, states do go mad. It
may be wisdom to insist, as Clausewitz so famously did, that war conform to
its political objective.4 It would be foolish to think that it always does.
The term “state” also deserves precise definition. Political scientists
often attach stringent conditions to statehood, but a state can be described accurately as any political entity which controls territory and population and
can effectively wield power relative to its neighbors. It may be vast, like the
Democratic Republic of Congo, or tiny, like Chechnya or Abkhazia. It may or
may not be internationally recognized or conventionally organized. It may be
ethnically homogeneous like Sweden or a tribal mosaic like Iraq. The form of
government is not particularly important. What matters is the ability to exercise control internally and maintain it when challenged.
States so defined may rise and implode. They may be little more than
criminal syndicates thinly disguised, like Transdniester, or patchworks of rival clans, like Somalia, or entities tortured by irreconcilable differences, like
Sudan. Whether stable or failing, however, states matter because, among
other things, they provide havens for international terrorism and transit
points for the flow of arms. While the West can conduct military operations
against transnational threats, as we have seen in Yemen and the Philippines, it
may take more to destroy the protected enclaves that a functioning regime can
offer when the financial or ideological price is right. It may take a war.
Critics have strenuously objected that the Clausewitzian thesis ignores the grave threats posed by international terrorism and other transnational actors.5 These are indisputably and powerfully real. But one does not
wage war in the pure sense against shadowy cells dispersed among many different sovereign states, some of whom are close allies and others of whom
may not even be aware of the terrorists in their midst. The war in Afghanistan
meets our definition because the Taliban controlled territory and population
and exercised the practical functions of statehood. Except in the purely local
sense, al Qaeda does not.
This is not to say that al Qaeda or Hezbollah or Hamas are not exceedingly dangerous. But the means used to combat terrorism, or narcotraffickers to cite another example, lie primarily in the intelligence, law enforcement, public diplomacy, and information-sharing arenas and only secondarily in the military sphere. This is an important point. States are not
waging war when armed force is not the primary agent. Used imprecisely,
6
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“war” assumes rhetorical importance as a way to mobilize popular support,
express seriousness of intention, and prepare the citizens for sacrifices. But
the state-directed use of armed force is not the thrust of the campaign against
international terrorism; it plays only a supporting role.
The vocabulary of war is important because so much is done in its
name. Perversely, Clausewitz is often condemned to irrelevance by those
who first redefine war and then castigate him for not describing it “accurately.”6 War understood in the classical sense remains consistent with
Clausewitz’s most famous aphorism, that war is simply the continuation of
political activity by other means. Explicit in Clausewitz’s formulation is the
notion that, because of its unpredictability and tendency toward extremes,
war must be subordinated to a rational purpose and clearly defined: “The
first, the supreme, most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and
the commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are
embarking.”7 And while military force is only one weapon among many, with
diplomatic, economic, political, informational, and even “soft power” instruments of statecraft available, it is by far the first among equals in wartime.
Even more powerful than the impact of death on societies is the impact of
ideas for which people are willing to die. Those ideas find their ultimate expression in the organized violence of states.
Today, no power on earth can compete with the United States and its
allies in major conventional war, and few seem inclined to try. But war itself
is flourishing, its essential nature unchanged. In northern and sub-Saharan
Africa, in Central Asia and the former USSR, in Kashmir and Tibet and above
all in the Middle East, war is a growth industry. Fueled by many things, but
above all by religion and economic disenfranchisement, war attracts desperate and disillusioned youth into a culture of violence. All too often, as a tool
for concentrating political power in the hands of the few, rearranging the political landscape, and redirecting challenges to authority toward real or imagined enemies, war works.

The Character of War
Given the dramatic changes sweeping the globe in virtually every
field, the temptation to think about war as something altogether different from
before is overpowering. Indeed, advocates of military transformation in the
United States assert that technology has redefined war altogether. Nothing
could be more mistaken. While the methods used to wage war are constantly
evolving, the nature and character of war remain deeply and unchangeably
rooted in the nature of man.
Clausewitz wrote, “If war is an act of force, the emotions cannot fail to
be involved.”8 The emotional or passionate side of war receives scant attention
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“Clausewitz endures, not because he is
universally understood or accepted but because
he is so often right about first principles.”

from modern theorists and policymakers, though it permeates state-to-state
conflict at every level. It is easy to imagine the fear and rage and grief of the
combatants, harder to see it in the cool press briefings of the leaders who make
war and the often mute suffering of the populations who must endure and support it. Yet it is ever-present. Clausewitz saw clearly that war has a nature all its
own, a nature that left to itself must run to extremes. This tendency of war to run
away with itself—to leap its banks and escape the original purpose of the
conflict—recurs over and over in history, pressing hard against the rational
courses of policy and strategy. Where does it come from?
War is much more than strategy and policy because it is visceral and
personal. Even when the existence of the state is not at risk, war in its purest
form is a struggle for personal or political survival, a contest for the highest
stakes played out directly by its participants and indirectly by the people and
their leaders. Its victories and defeats, joys and sorrows, highs and depressions are expressed fundamentally through a collective sense of exhilaration
or despair. For the combatants, war means the prospect of death or wounds
and a loss of friends and comrades that is scarcely less tragic. But society is
an intimate participant too, through the bulletins and statements of political
leaders, through the lens of an omnipresent media, and in the homes of the
families and the communities where they live. Here the safe return or death
in action of a loved one, magnified thousands of times, resonates powerfully
and far afield.
Depending on the state’s success in building popular support for war, a
reservoir of endurance to losses and defeats can exist. But it is finite, its depth a
measure of the public’s support for the causes engaged, and when it is exhausted
the government itself faces grave political risks. For this reason, if for no other,
war is the ultimate gamble. For soldiers and premiers alike, war is about survival. And the struggle for survival is inherently impatient with limits.
In this stressful and highly charged environment, violence has a cascading effect as the frustrations and frictions of the battlefield encourage everincreasing uses of force. Restraint and moderation are often the first casualties.
8
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The mounting toll of military and civilian casualties and the images of war,
seen firsthand or worldwide on CNN, beget a traumatized population and an increasingly exasperated and desensitized military. Except in very short conflicts, mounting impatience soon permeates the conduct of war, enhancing and
emphasizing its inherent emotional component. War’s ebb and flow may lead
to changes in its aims and objectives in mid-course, either from the thrill that
accompanies success or the dismay and even panic that follows defeat or stalemate. In either case, the rational and sober conduct of the war is constantly
challenged and influenced by passionate and elemental currents closely related
to the character of war itself. The ineluctable nature of war is summed up in the
words of the German general in Russia who said, “We are like a man who has
seized a wolf by the ears, and dares not let go.”9
The passion and emotion generated by war unquestionably account
for its durability and its tendency to spawn new and more vengeful conflicts
afterward. For wars are difficult to win conclusively. The wars of Napoleon
led to a reformed Prussian army and a revived military state that within the
same lifetime created modern Germany and destroyed the French Second
Empire. France smoldered for decades over the loss of Alsace-Lorraine
(“never speak of it, never forget”) and leapt eagerly into the fray in 1914. The
destruction of Wilhelmine Germany and the shame of Versailles birthed National Socialism and the Second World War, from which emerged the bitter rivalry between Russia and the United States and its peripheral wars in Korea
and Indochina. Today America is at war with many of the same mujahideen it
supported against the Soviets in Afghanistan, that Cold War spinoff of the
1980s. And on, and on. Enmities so powerful are transmitted through the generations with fearful force, as though the Glorious Revolution of 1688 or the
Battle of Kosovo Polje were current events and not ancient feuds.10
As Clausewitz noted, it is just this tendency which gives war its own
trajectory, its inherent anti-deterministic and nonlinear character. The firstorder effects of armed conflict between states may be apparent—the military
defeat of one side or the other, an exchange of territory, the fall of a regime, or
a shift in the local or international political equilibrium. But the second- and
third-order effects are never as easy to predict, and may be profound in their
unintended consequences. Even victory is often not the end. National populations, and the populist leaders who exploit them, do not easily forget or forgive. Taking the state to war is always a gamble, regardless of the military
balance of forces. Invariably, war will have its way. As Churchill put it:
Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone
who embarks on that strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he
will encounter. The Statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once
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the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events. Antiquated War Offices, weak, incompetent or arrogant commanders, untrustworthy allies, hostile neutrals, malignant
Fortune, ugly surprises, awful miscalculations all take their seat at the Council
Board on the morrow of a declaration of war. Always remember, however sure
you are that you can easily win, that there would not be a war if the other man
did not think he also had a chance.11

Despite a terrifying increase in its scope, scale, and lethality, war persists as a
political genre, first because it mobilizes and unifies the state behind its leaders as nothing else can, and second because states so often persuade themselves they can win. Rarely do states accept battle with no hope of victory.
Even the Melians expected succor from Sparta.
Intuitively building on war’s nonlinear character, Clausewitz advanced his famous “trinity” as one way to describe the contending forces
which affect the course of war. Often summarized as “the people, the army,
and the state,” the Clausewitzian trinity is actually more subtle and penetrating. He saw the emotional, inconstant force of the masses, the role of chance
and probability experienced on the battlefield by the military, and the state’s
attempts to subordinate war’s tidal forces to rational policy as a dynamic and
interactive process.12 A keen student of science, Clausewitz likened this interplay of forces to an object suspended between three magnets. Although subjected to like, measurable forces, the object reacts erratically and in ways
which cannot be replicated even under identical conditions—an apt analogy
for war that for all our modernity holds true.13
Over the millennia, man’s practical experience of war, of its horrors
and excesses, has brought forth all manner of international legal codes designed to limit its extent and effects. Augustine’s concepts of just and unjust
war and the attempts of Grotius to regulate its conduct in law have powerfully
influenced Western thought. But in the end, states most often interpret justice
in light of their interest, giving the use of force an enduring place among the
tools of statecraft.
Understanding war in its true form is crucially important because otherwise war can become an instrument for resolving all manner of political
disputes—an exceedingly dangerous state of affairs. Especially for powerful
states, whose military dominance suggests “easy” solutions for intractable
problems, war cuts through the tortured legalisms of international institutions,
shortcuts leaky economic embargoes, and truncates difficult and frustrating
diplomacy. Power and impatience are a seductive but deadly combination, best
controlled by thoroughly comprehending war as it really is. War is sometimes
the right, the true, and the wisest course. Sometimes the attacked party is given
no choice at all, except whether or not to resist. But a full understanding of
10
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war’s tendency toward extremes of violence and its unpredictable outcomes
militates against an early or easy recourse to force except under conditions of
great risk.
All of this may frustrate those who believe in more expansive or less
limiting definitions. Ongoing military operations in Iraq, for instance, or the
“Global War on Terrorism,” are proof to many that war has slipped the bonds
of state-to-state conflict. In Iraq or Afghanistan, however, military force may
be used to provide a secure environment, but in the current phase of “stability” operations, armed conflict, in military parlance, is not the “main effort.”
Public diplomacy, intelligence sharing, economic assistance, national and international law enforcement, and many other tools are as important, or more
important, than armed force in these and like instances.

The Conduct of Modern War
If Clausewitz’s reflections on the character of war remain valid, his
observations on the conduct of war are less apt. Few things change more rapidly than the conduct of war, rooted in the intersection between technology
and the political, economic, and military institutions of the state. That trend is
accelerating at a fantastic rate.
Beginning with the industrial revolution, the technology of war began to change exponentially rather than incrementally, outstripping tactics
and strategy, doctrine and organization. In the American Civil War, neither
side ever really grasped the impact of new technology on old ways of fighting. Fifty years later, the same could be said about the Great War. Because
technology evolves so quickly, the weapons of war often outrun its methods
and modalities. In general, technology has increased the distance at which
man kills, enhanced the lethality of his weapons, and reduced the time needed
to train him for war. For advanced, wealthy states, cutting-edge technology is
accelerating trends toward smaller, more professional, and more expensive
militaries oriented on precision weaponry and networked sensors.
As crucial as technology can be to war, other factors can and do play
decisive roles. At least from the time of the Punic Wars to the time of Constantine the Great, a span of some 500 years, the Roman army bestrode the
military scene and proved by far the most important factor in the growth and
stability of the Roman empire. Its greatness was based not on better weapons
but on its superior military institutions, expressed in careful training, organization, and discipline. These “human” factors often overshadowed technology in
the centuries that followed. Although the Mongols possessed nothing like the
heavily armored horsemen of Europe, and did not grossly outnumber their opponents as usually assumed, they created in a short time perhaps the largest empire in history, stretching from the Sea of Japan to the gates of Vienna. The
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victories of Gustavus Adolphus, Cromwell’s New Model Army, the Prussian
army of Frederick the Great, and the armies of Napoleon were not in the main
the results of technological overmatch. In the modern era, the Germans, Chinese, North Vietnamese, and Israelis all achieved outstanding battlefield successes against opponents armed with equal or superior technology. Future wars
may well see technology playing an even larger role. But other dimensions will
still play an important part in what remains essentially a contest of wills played
out by thinking and adaptive opponents.
Modern war, at least as practiced in the West, trades on American and
European technology and wealth, not on manpower and ideology. Western militaries are typically small, professional organizations officered by the middle
class and filled by working-class volunteers. Their wars are universally “out of
area”—that is, not fought in direct defense of national borders—placing a premium on short, sharp campaigns won with relatively few casualties. Although
land forces remain indispensable, whenever possible Western militaries fight
at a distance using standoff precision weapons, whose accuracy and lethality
make it difficult or impossible for less-sophisticated adversaries to fight conventionally with any chance of success. Increasingly, the West’s advantage in
rapid data transmission on the battlefield is changing how American and European militaries wage war, as control and use of information assumes decisive
importance.
The qualitative gap between the armed forces of the West and their
likely opponents is not likely to narrow for the foreseeable future. In this
sense the West’s absolute military advantage, arguably in force since the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, is likely to persist for generations. Although challengers may pursue niche technologies like anti-ship weapons, theater ballistic or
cruise missiles, or computer attack systems, their inability to match the capital expenditures and technological sophistication of the United States and its
NATO allies will make military parity highly doubtful, even when they act in
coalitions. Nor will nuclear weapons change this calculus. While the small
nuclear arsenals of potential adversary states may yield some deterrent benefits, their offensive use as weapons of war (as distinct from their use in terrorism) is doubtful given the vastly more capable nuclear forces belonging to the
United States, Britain, and France.
This gap in economic and technological capacity suggests other approaches for weaker adversaries. Here there is real danger. A quick look at the
protracted insurgencies of the past one hundred years is not encouraging. In
China, Vietnam, and Algeria, the West or its surrogates struggled for decades
and lost. Russia is experiencing the same agony in Chechnya. Even Western
“successes” in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Malaysia, and Aden proved painful
and debilitating.14 The ability of Western democracies to sustain major mili12
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tary ventures over time, particularly in the face of casualties suffered for less
than truly vital stakes, represents a real vulnerability. The sheer cost of maintaining large fighting forces in action at great distances from the homeland is
a liability that can be exploited by opponents able to tie down Western forces
in extended conflicts.
The costs of waging long, drawn-out conflicts will be counted in
more than dollars and lives. By a curious logic, the loss of many Americans in
a single event or short campaign is less harmful to our political and military
institutions than the steady drain of casualties over time. By necessity, the
military adapts to the narrower exigencies of the moment, focusing on the immediate fight, at some cost to the future investment, professional growth, and
broader warfighting competencies which can be vital in other potential conflicts of greater import. A subsidiary effect is loss of confidence in the military as an institution when it is engaged in protracted operations involving
mounting losses without apparent progress. It is too soon to tell if ongoing
military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will yield timely and fruitful results. But if they do not, the long-term effect on the health of the American
military could and probably will be damaging.
The experience of the Vietnam conflict, while not an exact fit, suggests that very long and enervating campaigns, fought for less than truly vital
objectives, delay necessary modernization, absorb military resources earmarked for other, more dangerous contingencies, drive long-service professionals out of the force, and make it harder to recruit qualified personnel.
These direct effects may then be mirrored more indirectly in declining popular support, more strident domestic political conflict, damage to alliances and
mutual security arrangements, and economic dislocation. These factors will
fall more heavily on ground forces, since air and naval forces typically spend
less time deployed in the combat theater between rotations, suffer fewer
losses, and retain career personnel in higher numbers.
Viewed as a case study in the application of Clausewitzian thought,
current military operations offer a vivid contrast to the wars fought in Afghanistan in 2001-02 and in Iraq in the spring of 2003. There, coalition military
power could be directed against organized military forces operating under the
control of regularly constituted political entities. Political objectives could be
readily translated into military tasks directed against functioning state structures (“destroy the Taliban and deny al Qaeda refuge in Afghanistan; destroy
the Iraqi military and topple Saddam’s regime”).
In the aftermath, the focus shifted to nation-building, a more amorphous and ambiguous undertaking with fuzzier military tasks. In Iraq, for example, there is no central locus of decisionmaking power against which
military force can be applied. Large-scale combat operations are rare, and miliSummer 2005
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“The United States and its European allies
must retain the heart and stomach for conflict,
however distasteful and unwanted.”

tary force, while a key supporting effort, is focused on stabilizing conditions so
that the main effort of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction can
proceed. Resistance appears to be local and fragmented, directed by a loose
collection of Sunni Baathist remnants, Shia religious zealots, foreign jihadists,
and, increasingly, local tribal fighters seeking revenge for the incidental deaths
of family and tribal members. Access to military supplies and to new recruits is
enabled both by neighboring powers like Iran and Syria and by local religious
and cultural sentiment.
In many ways the military problem in Iraq is harder today than it was
during major combat operations. Only rarely can we expect to know in advance our enemy’s intentions, location, and methods. In this sense, seizing
and maintaining the initiative, at least tactically, is a difficult challenge.
Clausewitz was well aware of this environment, which he called
“people’s war.” We can be confident that he would be uncomfortable with
open-ended and hard-to-define strategic objectives. However much we may
scoff at classical notions of strategy, with their “unsophisticated” and “unnuanced” focus on destroying enemy armies, seizing enemy capitals, installing
more pliable regimes, and cowing hostile populations, ignoring them has led to
poor historical results. A close reading of Vom Kriege shows that Clausewitz
did not neglect the nature of the problem so much as he cautioned against ventures which could not be thoroughly rationalized. Put another way, he recognized there are limits to the power of any state and that those limits must be
carefully calculated before, and not after, the decision to go to war.
In Iraq, it may well be that American and coalition forces will destroy a critical mass of insurgents sufficient to collapse large-scale organized
resistance, an outcome devoutly to be wished for. But if so, we are in a race
against time. For the American Army and Marine Corps, and for our British
and other coalition partners, the current level of commitment probably does
not represent a sustainable steady state unless the forces available are considerably increased. If the security situation does not improve to permit major
reductions in troop strength, eventually the strain will tell. At that point, the
14
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voting publics of the coalition partners and their governments may face difficult choices about whether and how to proceed.15
These choices will be tempered by the knowledge that the homeland
itself has now become a battleground. Open societies with heterogeneous
populations make Western states particularly vulnerable to terrorist attack,
always an option open to hostile states or the terrorist groups they harbor. And
however professional, the armies of the West are not driven by religious or
ideological zeal. That too can be a weapon—as the Americans and French
learned in Indochina and as we see today in the Middle East.
The foregoing suggests that in future wars the United States and its
Western allies will attempt to fight short, sharp campaigns with superior technology and overwhelming firepower delivered at standoff ranges, hoping to
achieve a decisive military result quickly with few casualties. In contrast to
the industrial or attrition-based strategies of the past, in future wars we will
seek to destroy discrete targets leading to the collapse of key centers of gravity and overall system failure, rather than annihilating an opponent’s military
forces in the field. Our likely opponents have two options: to inflict high
losses early in a conflict (most probably with weapons of mass destruction,
perhaps delivered unconventionally) in an attempt to turn public opinion
against the war; or to avoid direct military confrontation and draw the conflict
out over time, perhaps in conjunction with terrorist attacks delivered against
the homeland, to drain away American and European resolve.
In either case our enemies will not attempt to mirror our strengths
and capabilities. Our airplanes and warships will not fight like systems, as in
the past, but instead will serve as weapon platforms, either manned or unmanned, to deliver precision strikes against land targets. Those targets will
increasingly be found under ground or in large urban areas, intermixed with
civilian populations and cultural sites that hinder the use of standoff weapons.

The Future of War
Tragically, but inescapably, war remains a growth industry. Globalization and the development of international organizations notwithstanding,
armed conflict between states has accelerated sharply since the end of the
Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the creation of dozens of
new, weak states, flooded the developing world with arms, and reignited simmering ethnic feuds throughout the Balkans, the Middle East, Central Asia,
and Africa. Where bipolarity lent discipline to an otherwise anarchic system,
its demise fanned the flames of war, abetted by the powerful impulse of fundamentalist Islam and an ever-growing gap between the prosperous nations
of the West and the Pacific Rim and everyone else.
Summer 2005
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What does this mean for the West? First, it means that the United
States and its European allies must retain the heart and stomach for conflict,
however distasteful and unwanted. Their advanced economies, political leadership, and standards of living can and will be threatened. While challenged by
well-organized and capable terrorist groups, the West must also face the states
which arm, sponsor, or harbor them. Potentially threatening too are large, economically maturing powers like China, as well as politically fragile middleweights like Iran and North Korea, who possess very different worldviews, significant economic or military power, demonstrated antipathy to the West, and
nuclear weapons.
Overshadowing the clash of political interests is an increasingly incendiary religious struggle between Islam and other major world religions. In
the next century few things will matter more than the battle for the soul of Islam; should fundamentalist brands triumph and become mainstreamed, the
destabilizing effects throughout the Islamic world and the community of nations itself will be almost incalculable. Given a congruence between instability in the Islamic arc, increasing access to weapons of mass destruction, and
the presence of much of the world’s energy resources there, the interests at
stake for the West cannot be overstated.
Nevertheless, the future cannot be seen with perfect clarity. No government or state can see with precision the full panoply of future threats. In
the time of kings a ruler’s first duty was “to keep my own.” For the democracies of the West, no public duty rises higher than to preserve the freedoms and
institutions of democratic government and the people and territory they nourish. That duty will be as fully tested in the future as in the past.
In the West, the clear trend toward more technical approaches to
warfare and smaller, volunteer forces in part reflects a distaste for the sacrifices and rigors of military service, a distaste which is endemic in wealthy
states. If it continues, the shadows could well be lengthening for the West.
It has happened before. As their empire declined, the Romans, abandoning their earlier traditions, hired barbarian armies, manned their legions
with foreign recruits, and relaxed their exacting discipline. Successive
waves of primitive but warlike tribes, pushed westward by the pressures of
migratory populations and exhausted soil, battered and then overwhelmed
the frontier.
The West will not fall to that fate in this century, but its standard of
living and leading economic position in the world could be profoundly affected by military misadventure. Here there are dangers at both extremes.
America and the West, as a cultural and strategic consortium, may decline
through indifference to the effort, expense, and sacrifice of a competent
national defense. Here the willingness of the citizenry to participate in the
16
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common defense will be decisive. But we may also be weakened through
open-ended, enervating military operations, or by fighting wars that do not
command strong and sustained popular support.
Western societies are best served by armed forces that are respected
as disciplined, capable, selfless institutions that do not unduly burden the
state. Short, decisive wars fought for understandable and compelling reasons
and in support of Western, democratic values can strengthen, not erode, our
armed forces and military institutions. But the reverse—extended, indecisive
conflicts fought for peripheral interests or vague objectives—can impose
crushing financial burdens, seriously degrade military capability, and damage long-standing alliances and relationships. Democracies always have
been uncomfortable with professional militaries. But Western values and
strong economies are not enough.
Clausewitz would not be surprised at war’s enduring persistence and
ferocity. No less than in the past, the scourge of war remains with us, however
ardent our desire for a better way. When we can, the sum of human history argues eloquently for recourses other than war. When we cannot, the potential
consequences of defeat compel resolve. The sword still hangs in its scabbard,
waiting for the next round. The battle will go on. And if we are “to keep our
own,” so must we.
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